gulf of tonkin conspiracy gulf of tonkin conspiracy

PTF-3 and PTF-6 broke off and streaked south for safety; they were back in port before 1200. Lyndon Johnson on August 5, 1964, assertedly in reaction to two The Pyramid and All-Seeing Eye . Early Military Career The United States denied involvement. Neither ships crew knew about the North Vietnamese salvage operation. But by the end of June, the situation had changed. Hereafter referred to as FRUS, Vietnam 1964; Congressional Research Service, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part II, 1961-1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 287; Message CTG72.1 040140Z August 1964 (Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 425). For the rest of the war they would be truly secretand in the end they were a dismal failure. They never intended to attack U.S. forces, and were not even within 100 nautical miles of the U.S. destroyers position at the time of the purported second engagement.. A North Vietnamese patrol boat also trailed the American ships, reporting on their movements to Haiphong. Thus, this is an "official" history, not an official one because "the authors do not necessarily speak for the Department of Navy nor attempt to present a consensus." 12. Through the evening of Aug. 4, while no new information arrivedto clarify the eventin the Gulf, the White House narrative was firmly in place. The Science of Conspiracy Theories - Gulf of Tonkin conspiracy Despite this tremendous uncertainty, by midafternoon, the discussion among Johnson and his advisers was no longer about whether to respondbut how. 14. At 0354 on 2 August, the destroyer was just south of Hon Me Island. As such, its personnel in Vietnam were the envy of their Army counterparts in the bush since, as it was commonly put, sailors sleep between clean sheets at night (the grunts were also envious of the Air Force, where you fight sitting down). Although the total intelligence picture of North Vietnams actions and communications indicates that the North Vietnamese did in fact order the first attack, it remains unclear whether Maddox was the originally intended target. Until the ICC investigation blew over a week later, the commandos camped on a small pier. What did and didnt happen in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2 and 4 has long been in dispute, but the decisions that the Johnson Administration and Congress made based on an interpretation of those events were undeniably monumental. More important, they did not know the North Vietnamese had begun to react more aggressively to the commando raids. To subscribe to Vietnam Magazine, click here! Each boat carried a 16-man crew and a 57-mm recoilless rifle, plus machine guns. Sign up to get updates about new releases and event invitations. If there had been any doubt before about whose hand was behind the raids, surely there was none now. 14. This is another government conspiracy that's true. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American soldier casualties. In 1964 the Navy was attempting to determine the extent of North Vietnams maritime infiltration into the South and to identify the Norths coastal defenses so that Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) could better support South Vietnams commando operations against the North. Both men believed an attack on the American ships was imminent. Senate investigations in 1968 and 1975 did little to clarify the events or the evidence, lending further credence to the various conspiracy theories. Milestones: 19611968 - Office of the Historian WebNational Security Agency/Central Security Service > Home Forty-five minutes after beginning their attack, the commandos withdrew. Cruising twenty-eight miles offshore in international waters, Maddox was approached by the North Vietnamese. That night and morning, while cruising in heavy weather, the ships received radar, radio, and sonar reports that signaled another North Vietnamese attack. President Johnson and his advisers nevetheless went forward with a public announcement of an attack. In less than 25 minutes, the attack was over. A distinction is made in these pages between the Aug. 2 "naval engagement" and the somewhat more ambiguous Aug. 4 "naval action," although Marolda and Fitzgerald make it clear they accept that the Aug. 4 action left one and possibly two North Vietnamese torpedo-firing boats sunk or dead in the water. Subscribe to LBJ's War onApple Podcasts. In addition, the US Navy was instructed to conduct Desoto patrols off North Vietnam. In addition, the destroyer USS Turner Joy began moving to support Maddox. Neither the United States nor State of Vietnam signed anything at the 1954 Geneva Conference. Media reporting on the NSA reports assessments sparked a brief rehash of the old arguments about the Gulf of Tonkin. The stage was set. Herricks concerns grew as the SIGINT intercepts indicated that the North Vietnamese were concentrating torpedo boats off Hon Me Island, 25 nautical miles to his southwest. Aircraft from the Ticonderoga (CVA-14) appeared on the scene, strafing three torpedo boats and sinking the one that had been damaged in the battle with the Maddox. A Senate investigation revealed that the Maddox had been on an intelligence That initial error shaped all the subsequent assessments about North Vietnamese intentions, as U.S. SIGINT monitored and reported the Norths tracking of the two American destroyers. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) decided to resume Maddoxs Desoto patrol, but at a greater distance from the coast, accompanied by Turner Joy and supported by aircraft from Ticonderoga. SOG took the mounting war of words very seriously and assumed the worstthat an investigation would expose its operations against the North. Conducted under the nationally approved Operations Plan, OPLAN-34A, the program required the intelligence community to provide detailed intelligence about the commando targets, the Norths coastal defenses and related surveillance systems. The United States Military had three SIGINT stations in the Philippines, one for each of the services, but their combined coverage was less than half of all potential North Vietnamese communications. "14, Nasty fast patrol boats demonstrated their versatility in the Pacific Ocean before going to Vietnam.U.S. The ships gunners used the standard 5 mil offset to avoid hitting the boats. Two nearly identical episodes six weeks apart; two nearly opposite responses. President Johnson ordered a halt to all 34A operations "to avoid sending confusing signals associated with recent events in the Gulf of Tonkin." Moises book, however, was based on only the few SIGINT reports he was able to obtain through the Freedom of Information Act. He reported those doubts in his after action report transmitted shortly after midnight his time on August 5, which was 1300 hours August 4 in Washington. JCS, "34A Chronology of Events," (see Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 424); Porter, Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation (Stanfordville, NY: 1979), vol. The two boats headed northeast along the same route they had come, then turned south for the run back to South Vietnam. The reports conclusions about the Gulf of Tonkin Incident are particularly relevant as they offer useful insights into the problems that SIGINT faces today in combating unconventional opponents and the potential consequences of relying too heavily on a single source of intelligence. In the subsequent exchange of fire, neither American nor North Vietnamese ships inflicted significant damage. The World is a public radio program that crosses borders and time zones to bring home the stories that matter. The first such Desoto mission was conducted off the North Vietnamese coast in February 1964, followed by more through the spring. CIA Director John McCone was convinced that Hanoi was reacting to the raids when it attacked the Maddox. As the torpedo boats continued their high-speed approach, Maddox was ordered to fire warning shots if they closed inside 10,000 yards. In November of 2001, the LBJ Presidential library and museum released tapes of phone conversations with the President and then Defense . For 25 minutes the boats fired on the radar station, then headed back to Da Nang. In a conversation with Johnson, McNamara confirmedthis, with a reference to OP-CON 34A,acovert operation against the North Vietnamese. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. In 2005 documents were released proving that Johnson had fabricated the Gulf of Tonkin incident in order to justify attacking North Vietnam. Tonkin Gulf McNamara and the JCS believed that this intercept decisively provided the smoking gun of the second attack, and so the president reported to the American people and Congress. The Americans claimed they sank two torpedo boats and damaged a third, while the torpedo boats claimed to have shot down two American aircraft. The Maddox fired againthis time to killhitting the second North Vietnamese boat just as it launched two torpedoes. A firewall existed between covert patrol-boat attacks on North Vietnamese positions and Desoto patrols eavesdropping on shore-based communications. Taking evasive action, they fired on numerous radar targets. By then, early news accounts had already solidified some opinions, and the Johnson Administration had decided to launch retaliatory strikes. The North Vietnamese did not react, probably because no South Vietnamese commando operations were underway at that time. the Gulf of Tonkin In August 1964, Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf resolutionor Southeast Asia Resolution, as it is officially knownthe congressional decree that gave President Lyndon Johnson a broad mandate to wage war in Vietnam. It is not NSA's intention to prove or A brief account of the raids is in MACVSOG 1964 Command History, Annex A, 14 January 1965, pp. The conspiracy theory has been dying for several years, and this work will probably be a stake through its heart. Both the Phu Bai station and Maddoxs DSU knew the boats had orders to attack an enemy ship., Not knowing about the South Vietnamese commando raid, all assumed that Maddox was the target. Non-subscribers can read five free Naval History articles per month. At this point, U.S. involvement in Vietnam remained largely in the background. The Taliban silenced him. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident | Naval History (The recent NBC television movie In Love and War had Navy pilot James B. Stockdale flying over the scene at the time saying, "I see nothing"; now a retired vice admiral, Stockdale has reiterated the "phoney attack" charge in writings and public speaking.). Kennedy Hickman is a historian, museum director, and curator who specializes in military and naval history. Conspiracy Although McNamara did not know it at the time, part of his statement was not true; Captain Herrick, the Desoto patrol commander, did know about the 34A raids, something that his ships logs later made clear. The lack of success in SOGs missions during the first few months of 1964 made this proposal quite attractive. He also requested air support. Interview, authors with James Hawes, 31 March 1996. The reports conclusions about the Gulf of Tonkin Incident are particularly relevant as they offer useful insights into the problems that SIGINT faces today in 2. All missed, probably because the North Vietnamese had fired too soon. Media Manipulation. Meanwhile, by late August 3, the North Vietnamese had learned the condition of their torpedo boats and ordered a salvage tug to recover the damaged craft. He is the author of. Send the First Troops to Vietnam? This time the U.S. ships detected electronic signals and acoustic indications of a likely second North Vietnamese naval attack, and they requested U.S. air support. Not reported at the time, Herrick instructed his gun crews to fire three warning shots if the North Vietnamese came within 10,000 yards of the ship. We have no intention of yielding to pressure. The North Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made all this clear in September when it published a "Memorandum Regarding the U.S. War Acts Against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the First Days of August 1964." Ten shocking conspiracy theories that were completely Conspiracy One 12.7mm machine bullet hit Maddox before the boats broke off and started to withdraw. In the days leading up to the first incident of August 2nd, those secret operations had intensified.. Was the collapse of the Twin Towers on 911 terrorism are a controlled demolition. Ships radar detected five patrol boats, which turned out to be P-4 torpedo boats and Swatows. Air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which have been used in these hostile operations., The next day, the president addressed Congress, seeking the power to to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in Southeast Asia.. Aircraft from Ticonderoga arrived on-scene at 1528 hours and fired on the boats. Hickman, Kennedy. Each sides initial after-action review was positive. Seeking to follow the established policy of containment, Johnson and his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, began increasing military aid to South Vietnam. The most comprehensive and authoritative history site on the Internet. The Johnson Administration initially limited its response to a terse diplomatic note to Hanoi, the first-ever U.S. diplomatic note to that government. The Geneva Conference in 1954 was intended to settle outstanding issues following the end of hostilities between France and the Viet Minh at the end of the First Indochina War. Not all wars are made for navies, and the U.S. Navy had to insinuate itself into the Vietnam one and carve out a role. 4. Then they boarded their boats and headed back to Da Nang.12 The original radar contacts dropped off the scope at 2134, but the crews of Maddox and Turner Joy believed they detected two high-speed contacts closing on their position at 44 knots. In the future, conventional operations would receive all the attention. Sign up for The Top of the World, delivered to your inbox every weekday morning. Senator Morse was one of the dissenters. Based on this, they launched the political process that led to the wars escalation. 3. The North Vietnamese believed that, although they had lost one boat, they had deterred an attack on their coast. While 34A and the Desoto patrols were independent operations, the latter benefited from the increased signals traffic generated by the attacks of the former. Two days later, August 4, Maddox returned to the area, supported by the destroyer Turner Joy (DD-951). LBJ's War is a new, limited-edition podcast that unearths previously unheard audio that helps us better understand the course of the Vietnam War and how Lyndon Johnson found himself where he did. He headed seaward hoping to avoid a confrontation until daybreak, then returned to the coast at 1045, this time north of Hon Me. The North Vietnamese didnt buy the distinction; they attacked the USS Maddox. History is who we are and why we are the way we are.. The captain of Maddox, Commander Herbert L. Ogier Jr., ordered his ship to battle stations shortly after 1500 hours. The bullets struck the destroyer; the torpedo missed. Both were perceived as threats, and both were in the same general area at about the same time. Originally begun by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1961, 34A was a highly-classified program of covert operations against North Vietnam. Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964) | National Archives (2021, February 16). WHAT REALLY HAPPENED IN THE GULF OF TONKIN? When the contacts appeared to turn away at 6,000 yards, Maddoxs crew interpreted the move as a maneuver to mark a torpedo launch. Gulf of Tonkin incident, complex naval event in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of Vietnam, that was presented to the U.S. Congress on August 5, 1964, as two In fact, an earlier Desoto patrol planned for February had been canceled because of concerns over potential interference with South Vietnamese commando missions scheduled for the same time. 8. William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part II, 1961-1964, pp. This was reinforced by statements by retired Vietnamese Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap who admitted to the Aug. 2 attack but denied ordering another two days later. By then, the two American ships were approximately 80 nautical miles from the nearest North Vietnamese coastline and steaming southeast at 20 knots. We still seek no wider war.. Despite the on-scene commanders efforts to correct their errors in the initial after-action reports, administration officials focused instead on the first SIGINT reports to the exclusion of all other evidence. Three days later, she rendezvoused with a tanker just east of the DMZ before beginning her intelligence- gathering mission up the North Vietnamese coast. Moving in closer, the crew could see their targeta communications towersilhouetted in the moonlight. Message, COMUSMACV 291233Z July 1964, CP 291345Z July 1964. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution Both sides, however, spent August 3 reviewing their contingency plans and analyzing lessons learned from the incident. McNamara was ready to respond. 1, Vietnam 1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 611. WebThe Gulf of Tonkin and the Vietnam War. Operation Fast and Furious 10 This volume deals only with the former. During May, Admiral U. S. G. Sharp, the Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief, had suggested that 34A raids could be coordinated "with the operation of a shipboard radar to reduce the possibility of North Vietnamese radar detection of the delivery vehicle." Gradually, the Navy broadened its role from supply/logistics to aid/advisory -- training Vietnamese and developing the South Vietnamese navy's famed "brown water force," those riverine units operating in the country's matrix of rivers and canals and through the coastal network of islands and archipelagos. He then requested the passage of a resolution "expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in Southeast Asia." Midday on August 1, NSGA San Miguel, the U.S. Marine Corps SIGINT detachment co-located with the U.S. Army at Phu Bai, and Maddoxs own DSU all detected the communications directing the North Vietnamese torpedo boats to depart from Haiphong on August 2. "11 Despite Morses doubts, Senate reaction fell in behind the Johnson team, and the question of secret operations was overtaken by the issue of punishing Hanoi for its blatant attack on a U.S. warship in international waters. The Vietnam War buff will find it fascinating for its wealth of detail carefully set down in understated prose (a welcome relief, I might add, from the hysterical tone that marks much Vietnam War writing). "5, In reality there was little actual coordination between 34A and Desoto. Nonetheless, the North Vietnamese boats continued to close in at the rate of 400 yards per minute. In any event, the attack took place in broad daylight under conditions of clear visibility. The report covers all aspects of the efforts of the various American SIGINT agencies from the early postWorld War II years through the evacuation of Saigon. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. Thousands of passengers are stranded after Colombias Viva Air grounds flights, The last of Mexicos artisanal salt-makers preserve a 2,000-year-old tradition, I cannot give up: Cambodian rapper says he will sing about injustice despite threats from govt, Ukrainian rock star reflects on a year of war in his country, Ukrainian refugees in Poland will now be charged to stay in state-funded housing, This Colombian town is dimming its lights to attract more tourists to view the night sky, Kneel and apologize!: 76 years after island-wide massacre, Taiwan continues to commemorate and debate the tragedy. The Pentagon had already released details of the attack, and administration officials had already promised strong action. Suffice to say here that the version as presented here by Marolda and Fitzgerald is highly credible and completely plausible, and I for one am persuaded of its correctness. . The first critic report from Phu Bai reached Washington at about 0740 hours, Eastern Daylight Time (EDT). Hickman, Kennedy. WebJoe Rogan interview on the 911 Conspiracy Theory. There was more or less general acceptance of the Navy's initial account -- there was an unprovoked attack on Aug. 2 by three North Vietnamese patrol boats on an American warship, the destroyer USS Maddox in international waters. including the use of armed force" to assist South Vietnam (the resolution passed the House 416 to 0, and the Senate 88 to 2; in January 1971 President Nixon signed legislation that included its "repeal"). Forty-eight hours earlier, on Aug. 2, two US destroyers on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin the Maddox and the Turner Joy were attacked by North Vietnamese boats. Related:LBJ knew the Vietnam War was a disaster in the making. Historians still argue about what exactly happened in the Gulf of Tonkin in August of 1964. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 3 August 1964, FRUS, Vietnam, 1964, p. 603. Speculation about administration motives surrounding the Tonkin Gulf incident itself and the subsequent withholding of key information will probably never cease, but the factual intelligence record that drove those decisions is now clear. PTF-1 and PTF-2 were U.S.-built 1950s vintage boats pulled out of mothballs and sent to Vietnam. At the White House, administration officials panicked as the public spotlight illuminated their policy in Vietnam and threatened to reveal its covert roots. In July, General Westmoreland asked that Desoto patrols be expanded to cover 34A missions from Vinh Son north to the islands of Hon Me, Hon Nieu, and Hon Mat, all of which housed North Vietnamese radar installations or other coastwatching equipment. NSA officials handed the key August SIGINT reports over to the JCS investigating team that examined the incident in September 1964. WebCongress repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution before the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973. The contacts were to the northeast of the ship, putting them about 100 nautical miles from North Vietnam but very close to Chinas Hainan Island. Subscribe now and never hit a limit. By 1400 hours EDT, the president had approved retaliatory strikes against North Vietnamese naval bases for the next morning, August 5, at 0600 local time, which was 1900 EDT on August 4 in Washington. The series of mistakes that led to the August 4 misreporting began on August 3 when the Phu Bai station interpreted Haiphongs efforts to determine the status of its forces as an order to assemble for further offensive operations. Whether they produced battlefield images of the dead or daguerreotype portraits of common soldiers, []. Given the maritime nature of the commando raids, which were launched from Da Nang, the bulk of the intelligence collecting fell to the Navy. Because the North Vietnamese had fewer than 50 Swatows, most of them up north near the important industrial port of Haiphong, the movement south of one-third of its fleet was strong evidence that 34A and the Desoto patrols were concerning Hanoi. The truth about 'False Flags' from Nazi Germany to the Vietnam War Gulf of Tonkin - Wikipedia WebOn August 7, 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing President Johnson to take any measures he believed were necessary to retaliate and to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Westmoreland reported that although he was not absolutely certain why the Swatows were shifted south, the move "could be attributable to recent successful [34A] operations. Joseph C. Goulden, Truth Is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin AffairIllusion and Reality (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969), p. 80. No one was hurt and little damage wasdone in the attack, but intercepted cables suggested a second attack might be imminent.